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Abstract 
 
Recent breakthroughs in the policy environment of climate change shifted the paradigm for 
companies engaged in the fossil fuel value chain. Policy “shocks” with respect to the regulation 
and pricing of carbon emissions may accelerate the carbon transition, thereby causing harm to 
those companies whose business model is still centred around oil, gas and coal. 
The financial sector is exposed to the fossil fuel industry primarily via equity holdings, bonds 
and loans. Using a DCF analysis based on the 450 Scenario of the International Energy Agency 
and a pricing formula for bonds, a carbon stress test is applied to determine the expected loss 
for the vast majority of Dutch banks, insurers and pension funds. While the direct fossil fuel 
portfolio losses seem manageable, policymakers need to require more carbon related data dis- 
closure for all carbon intensive industries in order to improve the comprehensiveness of carbon 
stress tests. 
 
Keywords: stress test, climate change, financial sector  
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Phrase                        Definition 
 
450S                           450 Scenario 
 
ABP                            National Civil Pension Fund (NL) 
CCS                            carbon capture and storage 
CET 1                         Common Equity Tier 1 
 
CPI                             Climate Policy Initiative 
CPS                            Current Policy Scenario 
DCF                            Discounted Cash Flow 
DNB                           De Nederlandsche Bank / Dutch National Bank 
 
ESRB                         European Systemic Risk Board 
EUR                           Euro (European monetary unit) 
EV                              electric vehicle 
FTSE                          Financial Times Stock Exchange 
 
GHG                           greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Gt                               giga tonnes 
 
ICAAP                       Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
 
ICBC                          Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
 
IEA                             International Energy Association 
 
IPE                             Investment & Pension Europe 
 
IPCC                           Intergovernmental Penal on Climate Change 
 
LTO                            low tight oil 
 
OECD                         Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
PFZW                         Stichting Pensioenfonds Zorg and Welzijn 
 
PMT                           Pensioensfonds Metaal en Techniek 
 
PPM                           parts per million 
 
S&P 500                     Standard & Poor’s 500 
 
TCF                            trade commodity finance 
 
UNFCC                      United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
USD                           United States Dollar
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1. Introduction 
 
Although the IPCC (1995) already indicated strong scientific evidence that climate change is 
caused by human activities in 1995, this has become overwhelming scientific consensus in the 
21st  century (Oreskes, 2004; Alley et al, 2003). It is this scientific consensus and its daunting 
implications on future generations that have made 195 governments from all over the world 
agree to an unprecedented climate change agreement in December 2015 (UNFCC, 2015). The 
Paris Agreement aims to curb the rise in global warming below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 
However, this target remains only realistic if governments align their economic and environ- 
mental policy accordingly by implementing carbon-pricing mechanisms, including a carbon tax 
or a cap-and-trade policy that limits the amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) that may be emit- 
ted. Therefore, the current uncertainty related to climate change politics is not about the if, but 
how and when the transition will be implemented. 
 
While it has been shown that postponing climate change action will be far costlier from an 
economic point of view; inaction would be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each 
year (Stern, 2007). Yet, some companies would have to suffer more losses in the short term, 
leading to potential destabilisations across the economy. 
In a world with tighter carbon regulation, more natural resources would have to stay in the 
ground and remain “unburnable.” This would have most adverse implications for companies 
engaged in the oil and gas industry with the highest marginal extraction cost. In other words, 
most affected are companies at the high end of the industry cost curve that tend to be most 
carbon intensive. The reason for this is that high-cost sources of production, such as deep- 
water, oil sands or low tight oil (LTO) require a higher energy intensity in the extraction 
process. These companies are primarily private multinational integrated oil companies. (Lewis 
et al, 2014) 
 
This paper simulates the implications of a stricter environmental regulation by applying a 2°C 
scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA) on the valuation of stocks, bonds and loans 
from multinational integrated oil companies. Since the financial sector is exposed to this 
development by stock, bond and loan holdings of fossil fuel companies, a “carbon shock” is 
applied to the portfolio of the largest Dutch banks, insurers and pension funds. Stocks are 
valued according to a DCF model, whereas bonds and loans are valued according to a 
readjustment in recovery rates and probability of default. The most affected asset class is 
stocks, followed by bonds and loans. Pension funds have the highest exposure to transition risk 
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because of significant stock holdings in their portfolios. The overall risks for Dutch financial 
institutions seem manageable, but need to be observed more closely in order to make more 
accurate judgments about the expected future losses. 
 
The first part of the paper starts with a literature review and the explanation of crucial concepts, 
including “carbon budget,” “carbon bubble,” and “stranded assets.”  Chapter three discusses 
stress testing in general and the emerging field of climate stress testing in particular. Chapter 
four introduces the data about the carbon exposure of Dutch financial institutions before the 
methodology of the stress test is laid out in chapter five. Chapter six states the results of the 
stress test for banks, insurers and pension funds. The discussion and methodological limitations 
are presented in chapter seven and eight, respectively. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The financial sector will be affected by direct and indirect effects of climate change. Physical 
impacts of climate change are likely to affect insurance companies directly via the increase of 
acute risk and chronic risk. Acute risk manifests itself in the form of extreme weather events 
such as hurricanes, floods or tropical cyclones and is predicted to occur more often and with 
higher intensity (IPCC, 2014). Additionally, an increase in global warming is predicted to be 
accompanied by long-term structural shifts in climate patterns that may cause sea level rise or 
chronic heat waves. A case study about flood risks in the Netherlands by the Dutch National 
Bank (DNB, 2017a) finds three distinctive impacts on the financial sector: first, through direct 
exposure to commercial and residential buildings in affected areas, secondly through downward 
valuations of Dutch sovereign bonds and thirdly through secondary effects, such as lower 
economic growth or higher borrowing and lending costs for Dutch assets. In one adverse flood 
risk scenario, losses amount to EUR 60 billion to the Dutch economy, according to a scenario 
by the Dutch National Bank (2017). 
 
The indirect effects of climate change on the financial sector are mainly related to the transition 
to a lower-carbon economy, implying extensive policy, legal, technology, and market changes 
in order to address mitigation and adaption requirements. Depending on the speed and smooth- 
ness of adjustment of the transition, such risk factors may pose varying levels of risk to the 
institutions if they are being held responsible for climate change in their role as financers 
(DNB, 2016). Although courts have so far restricted the claims for affected parties, a single 
legal decision may set a precedent for liability. It is expected that insurers are most exposed to 
potential liability risks as providers of liability coverage to companies engaged in the fossil fuel 
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sector (Actuaries Institute, 2016). 
 
2.1 The concept of “carbon budget,” “carbon bubble” and “stranded assets” 
 
Since this paper focuses on the transition risks of climate change, that is, a policy “shock” on 
the financial sector related to climate change regulation, some concepts need more clarification. 
In this context, “climate risk” can be interpreted as “carbon risk” because a more stringent 
climate change policy essentially implies a higher price on GHGs (The Climate Institute, 2015). 
 
The negotiated agreement at the Paris climate conference in 2015 aims to curb the rise in global 
temperature “well below 2°C” of global warming until 2100 (UNFCCC, 2015). Nevertheless, 
just using the already listed reserves of coal, oil and gas on the world’s stock markets in the 
next 40 years would cause global warming to rise beyond 2°C (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 
2013). This would assume the unrealistic scenario that no new fossil fuel resources are explored 
and burned during the period. It is also not taking into account that two thirds of proven 
reserves is held by privately or state-owned companies. In other words, the world’s “carbon 
budget”, the maximum amount of carbon emissions that may still be emitted under a two 
degree scenario, is quickly running out. Researchers estimate that only a fraction of the proven 
reserves of listed companies can be used unmitigated.1  
 
Despite the evidence, current valuations of most companies involved in the carbon extraction 
value chain  appear  to  be  based  on  the  assumption  that  all  reserves  will  be  fully  
exploited (Boston Common Asset Management, 2014). The promise of extracting explored 
assets is the key determinant of a firm’s value that is engaged in the natural resources extraction 
segment. An analysis by McKinsey and the Carbon Trust (2008) estimated that more than 50% 
of the value of a publicly listed oil and gas company resides in the values of cash flows to be 
generated in year 11 and onwards. Thus, applying a transition scenario towards a low carbon 
economy implies a necessity to write off many “stranded assets” in the coal, oil and gas sector. 
By this metric, most companies in this sector appear to be significantly overvalued by the 
market. Although some price corrections have already taken place in recent years, most notably 
reflected by the drop in equity value among coal companies, new climate policies have not yet 
had a decisive impact on the stock prices of fossil fuel producers (DNB, 2016). 
                                                            
1 That is, only 900 GtCO2 of the total 1541 GtCO2 until 2050, and only another 75 GtCO2 until 2100 (Carbon Tracker 
Initiative, 2013). The World Resources Institute (2015) estimates that two thirds of  currently  proven  coal,  oil  and  gas  
reserves  would  have  to  remain  in  the  ground. McGlade and Elkins (2015) estimate that under a two degree global warming 
scenario, 33% of current oil reserves, 49% of gas reserves and 82% of coal reserves are unusable. 
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Research by the ESRB (2016) concludes that current market pricing reflects a lack of 
awareness of the challenges related to climate change, including widespread uncertainty 
regarding the path of policy.2  
 
Stranded carbon intensive assets can be rendered “unburnable” and form the basis of a “carbon 
bubble” in the financial sector (Baron & Fischer, 2015). Estimating a precise number for the 
amount of stranded assets leads to a wide divergence across various sources. According to the 
IEA’s 2°C compatible 450 scenario, USD 304 billion of stranded assets “will not recover all or 
part of their investment during the time that they are operational” by 2035 (IEA, 2014).3 A 
study by the Climate Policy Initiative (2014) estimates stranded assets as the difference in net 
value of output in a 2°C scenarios as opposed to a hypothetical business as usual scenario. This 
includes foregone revenues due to a combination of lower volume and prices of fossil fuels. 
According to their research, until 2035 stranded assets in power generation amount to USD 50 
billion and in the coal and gas sector to USD 600 billion and USD 400 billion, respectively 
(CPI, 2014). In a similar study, Lewis et al (2014), assuming the IEA 450 scenario, find that oil, 
gas and coal companies could lose USD 28 trillion in revenue over the next 20 years compared 
with baseline projections. Just the oil industry alone would face a 21% reduction in sales 
revenue. 
The substantial difference boils down to the different definition of assets: the IEA applies a 
narrower definition and assumes assets as physical capital without taking into account any 
foregone revenues (IEA, 2014). It should further be mentioned that the estimates by the IEA 
and CPI are based on a relatively smooth low-carbon transition, also assuming technological 
progress for carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
 
There are two important factors that could trigger a less orderly transition. First, an 
unanticipated breakthrough in low-carbon technologies that leads to more rapid cost decreases 
of technologies such as renewable energy, electricity storage or electric vehicles (Baron & 
Fischer, 2015). 
 
                                                            
2 Some of the largest multinationals in the oil and gas extraction business admitted that their business strategy is based on a 4°C 
global warming scenario (Macalister, 2015) (Davidson, 2017). Other peers, such as Exxon Mobil and Chevron argued prior to 
the multilateral Paris Agreement that climate change action is unlikely to occur and thus will not affect their business (Exxon 
Mobil, 2014). 
 
3 The largest stranded share of USD 180 billion is allocated in the upstream oil and gas investments, followed by USD 120 
billion for new fossil fuel capacity in the power sector and just USD 4 billion in the coal mining sector, since most of the initial 
investment cost have already been recovered. Because state-owned companies own the majority of oil and gas reserves 
worldwide, they are predicted to be most affected (Mitchell, Marcel, & Mitchell, 2015). 
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Second, while future scenarios assume smooth evolutions in energy prices, sudden price 
movements could potentially interfere with such scenarios. Energy prices have the potential to 
react imminently and strongly to the economic environment and shifts in supply and demand. 
In June 2014, the oil price stood at USD 105 per barrel and fell to USD 45 in September 2015. 
The current situation poses a dilemma for the oil and gas industry: while low prices render 
many explored projects unprofitable, a price increase further incentivises the research and 
development activities for green alternative technologies (Mitchell et al, 2015). 
 
Even if the discussed write offs for stranded assets would follow an orderly energy transition 
and occur over a longer time period, it will almost inevitably pose shocks to the world 
economy, especially once investors lose confidence and start divesting the affected asset 
classes. Clerk et al (2016) find that while the first-order impact of financial sector losses on 
carbon intensive assets seems manageable, the initial shock could trigger negative feedback 
loops due to information spillovers. In fact, recent macroeconomic modelling estimates that 
major stock markets might plunge by 15% - 20% after markets would correctly price assets 
according to a two degrees global warming scenario (CISL, 2015). 
 
In this paper divestment is defined as “the action or process of selling off subsidiary business 
interest or investments” (Stevenson, 2010) triggered by risks related to climate change. Ansar et 
al (2013) analyse the impact of investor’s divestment outflows from fossil fuel companies, 
which could quickly lead to stigmatisation, a higher uncertainty that such firms are able to 
convert its reserves into positive cash flows, financing problems and a lower intrinsic value of a 
stock. As predicted in the report, coal companies characterised by larger fossil fuel emissions 
than companies in the oil and gas sector are particularly vulnerable of being stigmatised as 
“scapegoats” for climate change. The recent global divestment movement directed against coal  
companies  shows  how  rapid  divestment  movements  can  gain  momentum  when public 
campaigns are effectively carried out (Ayling & Gunningham, 2017).4  
 
However, the risk of divestment may not be limited to the fossil fuel industry.  In a similar 
fashion, financial institutions are facing reputational risks if customers and other stakeholders 
raise concerns about certain exposures. This may further contribute to a shift of investor’s 
appetite away from carbon intensive assets. 
 
 
                                                            
4 After Bank of America announced in May 2015 that it intends to reduce its financial exposure to the coal sector, other major 
financial institutions, such as Crédit Agricole, Citibank and Allianz followed suit (Batten, Sowerbutts, & Tanaka, 2016). 
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2.2 Transition risks for banks, pension funds and insurers 
 
Given the described transition risks, banks are primarily affected through the exposure of bonds 
and loans to counterparties in sectors characterised by high fossil fuel abatement, including but 
not limited to the fossil fuel industry, electricity production, heavy industry, agriculture, real 
estate and transport (French Treasury, 2015). In order to assess the transition risks banks are 
facing, it is thus necessary to identify the sectorial exposures most sensitive to the transition. 
Some of the European national banking authorities have recently started to analyse the scope of 
their financial carbon exposure: research by the Dutch National Bank (2016) finds that 11% of 
total assets in the balance sheets of the three largest banks is tied to carbon-intensive sectors. 
For the major French banks, the exposure amounts to almost 13% (French Treasury, 2015). 
 
The portfolios of pension funds are vulnerable through the direct exposure to transition risks 
mainly via listed equity holdings of companies in fossil fuel intense sectors, and to a lesser 
extent, bond holdings. Since institutional investors tend to invest in equity via main stock ex- 
change indices, the exposure to carbon bubble risk of an equity portfolio depends on the 
selected index (Weyzig, Kuepper, van Gelder, & van Tilburg, 2014). The weight of the fossil 
fuel sector (including oil, gas and coal) in the major stock exchanges ranges from 
approximately less than 10% in the French Euronext, 11% in the US S&P 500 index to more 
than 20% in the London Stock Exchange (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011). By the end of 
March 2016, the oil and gas sector alone accounted for 12.5% of the FTSE 100 index in 
London (Batten et al, 2016).  
 
Research by Mercer (2015) concludes that the traditional approach of institutional investors to 
strategically allocate assets over different classes, i.e. equity, bonds and real estate, is not 
effective when hedging against a carbon bubble because climate change risk affects these asset 
classes at the same time. It will be more important to focus instead on the risk within each asset 
class, for example low-carbon and high-carbon listed equities. 
 
The transition to a low carbon economy is likely to affect both the asset and liability side of 
insurance companies’ balance sheets (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015). If business 
activity in carbon-intensive sectors will be reduced, this would negatively affect insurers’ 
liabilities via a decrease in insurance premiums. The current share of the energy sector for the 
UK general insurance industry is estimated to be around 4% (PRA, 2015). 
On the asset side, insurer’s investment portfolios are likely to be negatively impacted by       
mispriced carbon-intensive assets with broad implications for both life and general insurers. 
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The financial authority of the UK estimates a 5% exposure of total life insurance and a 2.2% of 
total non-life assets to the energy sector, with most investments in bonds rather than equities 
(PRA,2015). Overall, the PRA concludes that transition risks for insurers are manageable; 
nevertheless, life insurers will be most affected due to the nature of the relatively long-term 
horizon of their investments. 
 
3.	  Stress	  Testing	  
 
As a supervisory tool, a stress test serves to measure the extent of vulnerability of financial 
institutions to certain pre-specified risk factors. It is intended to provide an indication how 
much capital might be necessary to absorb potential losses as a consequence of a large shock 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009). 
 
In the context of global warming as a consequence of climate change, this paper employs a 
stress test based on the carbon exposure of the Dutch financial system, including major banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds. 
 
3.1 Linking traditional stress testing to a climate change stress test 
 
Stress testing can be conducted for two ends: either for macro- or micro-prudential purposes. 
Macro-prudential stress tests are employed in order to assess the impact of an adverse 
macroeconomic shock scenario on the financial system as a whole, whereas micro-prudential 
stress tests intend to measure the financial resilience of individual institutions (DNB, 2017b).  
Despite the recent pressure of institutional investors for more disclosure of climate change 
related risk, no individual financial institution has yet conducted a climate change stress test 
(Flood, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, two types of stress tests are most commonly applied in the context of the Internal 
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) of the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (2006): scenario tests and sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis only evaluates 
the impact of an individual risk driver on an institution’s financial robustness. In contrast, 
scenario analysis is a more complex approach, characterised by multiple and simultaneously 
moving risk drivers, such as long- and short term interest rates, inflation, GDP growth, 
unemployment, real estate prices or equity indices (DNB, 2017b). 
 
Selecting the specific model for the stress test may start with events that challenge the viability 
of the bank, so called “tail events.” As the current paradigm of best practice states, scenarios 
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should be applied that are “severe, yet plausible:” severe enough to have an impact yet 
plausible enough to be taken seriously (Quagliarello, 2009). To take an earthquake analogy: 
how severe and long is the earthquake, and how solid does the fundament of the house still 
have to be once the earthquake has stopped? 
 
The Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB, 2016) 
suggests that the most severe systemic risk for the EU financial system lies in a late and sudden 
adaption of climate change regulation, the so-called “hard landing” scenario. The underlying 
assumption for a transition scenario is not if there will be stricter climate change regulation but 
when. 
The reasons why many stakeholders around the issue have not placed much importance on 
climate change as a shock scenario are twofold. First of all, behavioural biases play a role: 
human beings tend to be biased against correctly assessing the impact of low probabilities 
events on one variable, and even more so if it comes to a portfolio with many correlated 
exposures (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Hence, it is difficult to intuitively grasp the impact of 
an adverse shock on unidentified risk factors and the wider financial system. 
Secondly, transition risk is usually not regarded as a shock but rather as a long process with 
various policy steps towards a low carbon economy. However, this must not be the case, as the 
sudden regulation of tobacco in the US or nuclear energy in Germany has shown.5  
 
For a common top-down stress test framework, the credit risk exposures of a bank play a major 
role. Such exposures are generally related to a bank’s lending portfolio: in times of economic 
stress, higher unemployment implies that more households will fail to meet their mortgage re- 
payments. Similarly, more bankrupt firms default on their loans. As a consequence, banks will 
incur more losses and need to write off assets on their balance sheet on a larger scale 
(impairment) (DNB, 2017a). 
Additionally, the predefined risk drivers of a stress test also affect market risk exposure. If 
stock markets lose substantial value, all financial institutions that are exposed to equity 
investments are facing impairments and value adjustments (Henry & Kok, 2013). 
                                                            
5 The US government was able to take action decisively and rapidly, despite the existence of a strong lobby (Saloojee & Dagli, 
2000). In the context of energy and environment politics, the German government initiated a sudden energy transition 
(“Energiewende”) in the aftermath of the Fukushima catastrophe in 2011 (Smedley, 2013). As a consequence, an immediate 
phase out of almost all German nuclear power plants was mandated, causing billions of stranded nuclear assets and shockwaves 
for the valuation of German utilities. RWE and EON, the largest utility provider in Germany, lost billions of its market value in 
the course of a few days (Meinke, 2011). 
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The climate stress test applied in this paper also focuses on credit and market risk exposure. 
Specifically, the carbon intensive exposures are analysed with respect to each asset class. Credit 
risk for banks materialises if carbon intensive companies in the oil, gas and coal sector will be 
unable to meet their credit obligations. All financial institutions are exposed to market risk via 
equity holdings of companies in the carbon intensive sectors; this will lead to impairments as a 
result of value adjustments of those companies on the stock exchange. 
 
The last step and ultimate goal of a stress test is to assess whether the financial institutions still 
possess sufficient liquid capital to absorb the losses. In order to do so, the amount of core 
capital is weighted against a pre-defined threshold of risk-weighted assets. For example, the 
European Banking Authority (2014) recommends a threshold value at a core capital ratio of 
5.5% (Common Equity Tier 1 ratio or CET 1 ratio). Core capital, usually referred to as “Tier 1 
capital,” is the most important parameter to measure a bank’s resilience against adverse shocks 
because it has the highest loss absorbing capacity (DNB, 2017b). Tier 1 capital must 
predominantly consist of common stock and retained earnings (European Actuarial 
Consultative Group, 2013). 
A similar approach is valid for insurers. For insurers located in the EU, the unique regulatory 
framework on which capital requirements for insurers rests is called Solvency II. The solvency 
ratio under Solvency II bases eligible own funds against required capital and needs to be higher 
than 99.5%. Similar to the banking sector, such own funds need to be mostly (80%) made up of 
tier 1 capital, and the remaining share of tier 2 and tier 3 capital. The required capital depends 
on the risk exposure of the portfolio of the insurer, where equities are heavier weighted than 
government bonds. (DNB, 2016) 
However, in a stress scenario the core capital of a financial institution is negatively affected by 
the change in net income due to impairments and a decreased value of investments, among 
other factors. This effect remains the same, irrespective if the shock is caused by carbon 
transition risk or a structural break in the business cycle. 
 
Lastly, the outcome of every stress test is strongly contingent on both the chosen scenario and 
modelling assumptions (DNB, 2017b). The contextual element of a stress test is therefore 
critical to bear in mind. 
 
3.2 Climate change stress testing 
 
The academic field of climate change risk for financial stability is relatively new. The Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China contributed to the theoretical approach of financial stress 
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testing based on environmental factors on credit risks of banks (ICBC, 2016). Weyzig et al 
(2014) investigate carbon exposures of EU financial institutions and emphasise the need for a 
“carbon stress test.” Applying a network analysis of the exposures of financial actors in the EU 
to cli- mate-relevant sectors, Battiston et al (2017) find that although direct exposures are small, 
combined exposures are substantial and amplified via financial counterparties. The analysis in 
this paper does not take into account second order effects, which most likely understates the 
implications of the stress test. Second order effects are part of a “cause-effect” chain triggered 
by an external shock that has an impact on key economic and financial variables responding 
endogenously to the scenario (Miller, 2006). 
 
In a stress test related framework, the World Resources Institute (2015) suggests how to 
evaluate the financial impact of carbon asset risk on the financial portfolio level. An example of 
an applied scenario-based approach on the portfolio-level risk assessment is Mercer’s (2015) 
“Investing in a Time of Climate Change” that integrates four climate scenarios and four climate 
risk factors into an investment modelling process along traditional assumptions and input 
factors. The impact of climate change on portfolio returns, asset classes and industry sectors is 
modelled for a 35-year timeframe (2015 – 2050). The study concludes that despite a moderate 
long-term impact of climate risks on a diversified portfolio, short-term transition risks are 
severe for the coal, oil and utilities sector. 
The Cambridge Institute for Sustainable Leadership (2015) analyses the climate change impact 
on economic growth and investment portfolios using a common macroeconomic general 
equilibrium model with three distinctive climate scenarios over a five-year period (2015 – 
2020). The model predicts strong repercussions on the economy in the short to medium term. 
 
4. The Data 
 
Company input data for the five largest integrated oil and gas producers in the world by 
revenue (Exxon Mobil, Shell, BP, ConocoPhillips and Total) was retrieved from Bloomberg 
and publicly available financial statements. The predictions used in the analysis of the paper are 
based on the International Energy Agency’s6 (IEA) Current Policy Scenario and the 450 
Scenario. Data for capital expenditure projections are based on the work of Accenture (2016). 
The six largest pension funds in the Netherlands were retrieved from a ranking by Investment 
Pension Europe that was published in September 2016 (IPE, 2016). Wherever data was only 
                                                            
6 The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an intergovernmental organisation founded 1973 by the OECD member countries as 
a response to the oil crisis 1973. Ever since, it publishes a yearly World Energy Outlook about relevant energy trends and 
predictions for multiple scenarios. 
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exhibited in Euro, the data was converted to USD based on the exchange rate on 1 January 
2018 to stay coherent throughout the analysis. 
 
For an analysis of the Dutch financial sector’s exposure to high-carbon assets, aggregate data 
for the three largest banks, six insurers and six pension funds were provided by the Dutch 
National Bank (DNB). These institutions comprise together 75% of the cumulative balance 
sheet total of the Dutch financial sector. The initial survey by the DNB was held at the 
beginning of 2016. The data on the specific exposure of each asset class to the fossil fuel 
industry relates to the entire value chain of oil, gas and coal companies, meaning that 
downstream extraction companies are included as well as suppliers, service providers and 
related infrastructure (e.g. pipe- lines). (DNB, 2017a) 
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The	  total	  carbon	  asset	  exposure	  of	  the	  Dutch	  financial	  sector	  by	  asset	  
class	  and	  industries	  
 
Although	  this	  paper	  only	  investigates	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  carbon	  asset	  exposure	  
to	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  sector	  that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  carbon	  
bubble.	   The	   following	   sectors	   also	   carry	   significant	   carbon	   asset	   risks:	   traditional	  
power	  generation,	  chemical	  industry,	  construction	  materials,	  metal	  and	  mining,	  paper	  
and	  lumber,	  transport	  (air,	  road	  and	  maritime)	  as	  well	  as	  agriculture	  and	  food.	  
 
Figure	  1	  illustrates	  the	  exposure	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  intensive	  assets	  by	  industry.	  Financial	  
institutions	  are	  most	  exposed	  to	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  sector	  (3.2%),	  followed	  by	  agriculture	  
and	  food	  (2.8%)	  and	  transport	  (1.8%).	  The	  total	  exposure	  expressed	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  





































Figure	  1:	  Exposure	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  intensive	  assets	  by	  industry	  (expressed	  as	  percentage	  of	  total	  as-­‐	  
sets)
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The	  exposure	  per	  asset	  class	  is	  exhibited	  in	  Figure	  2.	  Loans	  are	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  as-­‐	  
sets	  most	  exposed	  to	  carbon	  asset	  risk:	  13.1%	  of	  all	  loans	  are	  loans	  from	  fossil	  fuel	  in-­‐	  
tensive	  sectors.	  The	  second	  most	  exposed	  asset	  class	  is	  stocks	  with	  9.9%,	  followed	  by	  
alternative	  investments	  with	  7.1%	  and	  bonds	  with	  6.8%	  exposure.	  	  The	  average	  expo-­‐	  
sure	  per	  asset	  class	  is	  9.2%.	  
 
To	   conclude,	   the	   overall	   exposure	   levels	   per	   industry	   and	   asset	   class	   become	  
significant	  when	  added	  together.	  While	  investigating	  specifically	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  sector	  
(oil,	   gas	   and	   coal)	   can	   only	   give	   a	   partial	   result	   in	   case	   of	   a	   shock,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  
exposures	   of	   that	   magnitude	   to	   other	   carbon	   intensive	   sectors	   will	   also	   have	  




































Figure	  2:	  Exposure	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  intensive	  sectors	  by	  asset	  class	  (expressed	  as	  percentage	  of	  total	  
assets	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Among the three largest financial sectors in the Netherlands, the banking industry holds more 











As can be seen by looking at Figure 4 (overview about relative exposures), the portfolio com- 
position for fossil fuel assets differs substantially among the three financial sectors. Banks act 
almost exclusively as issuers of loans, with zero holdings of any stocks. The total exposure 
amounts to USD 48.8bn, equivalent to almost 3% of total assets. 
With a total exposure of less than 2% (USD 9.9bn), insurers exhibit the lowest vulnerability 
among the three main sectors. Yet, the large exposure to bonds stands out: more than 70% of all 
fossil fuel producers’ assets are bond holdings. The remaining amount is mainly covered by 
equities. (Figure 4) 
Pension funds have the largest exposure relative to their total assets: about 5.4% (USD 42.5bn) 
are allocated to the sector. The largest share is composed of commodities (2.1%), equity hold- 
ings (1.9%) and other assets (0.7%). “Other assets” are made up of alternative investments 
(private equity, hedge funds and infrastructure investments) and are not part of the analysis 
because of the wide range of asset classes. (Figure 4) 
 
Both the magnitude and the given asset composition of pension funds make them the most 
vulnerable financial sector to potential shocks. However, the nature of a more flexible portfolio 
of pension funds means that they may adjust their investment strategy more rapidly than banks 
or insurers (DNB, 2016). 




Figure 4: Overview of fossil fuel exposure of each financial sector 
 
“Note: ‘Loans’ consist of traditional corporate loans and trade finance to parties engaged in fossil fuel 
trading. ‘Equities’ consist of investments in equities, equity funds and derivatives. ‘Bonds’ consist of 
corporate bonds and bonds issued by sate-owned companies. ‘Commodities’ consist of direct invest- 
ments in commodities, futures contracts and fund investments in commodities. ‘Other’ consist primarily 






Testing transition risks for the Dutch financial system starts with the exposure data of banks, 
insurers and pension funds. Specifically, exposures to the oil and gas industry are analyzed in 
detail, as the carbon transition poses the most severe risk to firms directly involved in the fossil 
fuel value chain (Lewis et al, 2014). The first part of the analysis employs a discounted cash 
flow (DCF) model to calculate the loss in value of fossil fuel stocks for financial portfolios of 
each respective financial sector. In the second part, the affected bonds and loans of fossil fuel 
companies are readjusted according to the expected loss formula by Ramaswamy (2004). 
 
As the aim of the paper is to measure the impact of climate change risk in the form of a “policy 
shock” on the financial industry, the shock scenario applied follows directly the 450 scenario 
by the IEA (2016). Based on Meinshausen et al (2009), the carbon budget of the world is set to 
1,440Gt of GHG until 2050 in order to have a 50% chance to limit the rise in global 
temperature to 2°C above preindustrial levels. However, for the long-term temperature to stay 
below 2°C, the IEA assumes to reduce carbon concentration to 450 ppm (IEA, 2014).  
This implies a gradual reduction in fossil fuel consumption. In contrast, the Current Policy 
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Scenario serves as a benchmark against which the 450 Scenario is stressed. It includes only 
those policies that have been enacted by mid-2016 (IEA, 2016). 
 
The impact of both scenarios can be investigated by the means of a discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis. The DCF is a common company valuation methodology where future cash flows are 
discounted by the weighted average cost of capital of the firm (combined cost of debt and cost 
of equity). Since one particular firm has limited representativeness of a whole sector, the aver- 
age financials of the five largest integrated oil and gas firms are merged for the purposes of this 
research to create a new artificial company. Cash flows are projected for a five-year horizon 
2018 – 2022. The cash flow of the last year is taken as the base to calculate the present value of 
the terminal value. 
 
The most crucial input variables for a DCF analysis of a multinational oil company are revenue 
growth, capital expenditure development and the discount rate. Revenue growth determines 
principally the magnitude of future cash flows. The IEA (2016) provides sophisticated 
estimates for future oil demand and price trajectories according to each scenario. For simplicity, 
it is assumed that the sum of the compounded annual growth rates for oil demand and price 
predict revenues of oil multinationals proportionally on a linear scale (Table 1). This 
assumption is based on the analysis of Granli (2009) who studied the impact of oil price 
changes on share prices of oil and gas companies in the period between 1990 and 2007. The 
author concludes that share prices of integrated energy companies can be well explained by 
changes in oil prices. 
 
While the predictions for the period 2016 – 2020 do not differ considerably between the sce- 
narios, in the long term the demand for oil is predicted to diverge substantially between the 
Current Policies Scenario (CPS) and the 450 Scenario (Appendix 1).  For the 450 Scenario, oil 
production is reduced by 10.5% between 2020 and 2030, whereas under the CPS oil production 
increases by 10.1% in the same time period (IEA, 2016). Furthermore, the oil price increases 
significantly slower under the 450 Scenario than under the CPS between 2020 and 2030 (1.7% 
vs 5.0%, respectively) (Appendix 2). 
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The	  450	  scenario:	  a	  policy	  “shock”	  
 
The	  450	  Scenario	  by	  the	  IEA	  limits	  global	  warming	  to	  2°C	  until	  2100	  (equivalent	  to	  450	  
parts	   per	   million	   CO2),	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   Paris	   Agreement	   in	   2015.	   Since	  
national	  governments	  tend	  to	  be	  slow	  to	  pass	  laws	  into	  action	  after	  such	  an	  agreement,	  
a	   shock	   only	   occurs	   around	   the	   year	   2020	   when	   carbon	   pricing	   mechanisms	   are	  
adopted	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  first	  in	  the	  power	  generation	  and	  industry	  sectors,	  later	  also	  
extended	   to	   the	   transport	   sector.	   It	   is	   assumed	   that	  OECD	   countries	  will	   initiate	   the	  
transition,	   implementing	   a	   carbon	   price	   of	   USD	   130/t	   in	   2030	   and	   USD	   140/t	   until	  
2040.	   Other	   major	   non-­‐OECD	   countries,	   such	   as	   China	   and	   Russia,	   are	   assumed	   to	  
follow	   suit	   with	   carbon	   prices	   rising	   slightly	   below	   OECD	   countries’	   level	   in	   2040.	  
Additionally,	   fossil	   fuel	   subsidies	   are	   expected	   to	   have	   been	   eliminated	   until	   2040,	  
except	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  (IEA,	  2016)	  
 
Thanks	  to	   the	  widespread	  adoption	  of	  carbon	  pricing	  mechanisms	  around	  the	  world,	  
low	  carbon	  technologies	  are	  expected	  to	  gain	  momentum.	  Specifically,	  variable	  renew-­‐	  
able	  energies	  (wind	  and	  solar),	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  (CCS)	  and	  alternative	  fuel	  
vehicles	  (EVs)	  would	  stand	  to	  gain	  (IEA,	  2016).	  
 
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  would	  be	  a	  policy	  response	  unseen	  of	  in	  the	  history	  of	  climate	  
change	   policy,	   it	   does	   not	   seem	   too	   unrealistic	   if	   the	   multilateral	   climate	   change	  
agreement	  in	  Paris	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  IEA	  (2016)	  estimates	  that	  
USD	   304bn	   of	   stranded	   assets	   would	   not	   at	   all	   or	   only	   partially	   recover	   their	  
investment	  during	  their	  operational	  lifespan.	  The	  450	  Scenario	  is	  only	  based	  on	  a	  50%	  





As companies in the fossil fuel extraction sector are characterised by considerable spending in 
machinery and equipment, capital expenditure projections also form an important part in the 
valuation of those companies (Guilford, O'Connor, & Cutler, 201). The results of the analysis 
for capital expenditure projections are based on work by Accenture (2016). Following the 
demand projections by the IEA for each scenario, capital expenditure rises significantly in the 
CPS and decreases slightly in the 450 scenario as of 2020. The weighted average cost of 
capital is assumed to remain stable for the future. 
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The second part of the analysis includes the valuation of bonds and loans under the same 
scenarios. Bonds and loans are only treated differently in the calculation of the loss on default 
due to different recovery rates. According to Ramaswamy (2004), the expected loss for a 
corporate bond portfolio can be calculated with the following formula: 




EL = expected loss 
 
NE = nominal exposure 
 
PD = probability of default 
 
LD = loss on default 
 
Furthermore, the loss on default is calculated by: 
𝐿D  =  𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦    −  𝑅R 
 
where 
𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦    = dirty price of the bond 
RR = recovery rate 
 
 
Although there is evidence that the dirty price of a bond is negatively correlated with the 
probability of default, for simplicity most credit risk models assume an independent 
relationship between the two parameters (Ramaswamy, 2004). Therefore, the dirty price will be 
equal to one. 
 
 
The two main variables that are affected by the stress test are the probability of default and the 
recovery rate. First, the probability of default increases with the rate of change of the difference 
of DCF valuations between the scenarios. The base rate is taken from a report by S&P (2016), 
an international rating agency, that estimates the default rate of the energy and natural resource 
sector at 6,5% in 2015. 
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The average recovery rate measures the share of a defaulted debt instrument that can be 
recovered. For the year 2010, Moody’s (2011), an international rating agency, calculated the 
average corporate debt recovery rates measured by post-default trading prices. First lien bank 
loans recovered on average 72.3% of its value, whereas senior secured bonds recovered only 
54.7%. For the sake of the stress test, these recovery rates are then subtracted by 16.5% (50% x 
33%). This is because of the findings by McKinsey and the Carbon Trust (2008) and McGlade 
and Elkins (2015). The former estimated that more than 50% of the value of a publicly listed oil 
and gas company resides in the values of cash flows to be generated in year 11 onwards. The 
latter estimated that 33% of all proven oil reserves cannot be extracted from the ground under 
the 2 degree scenario. 
 
Since loans and bonds are both affected by the result of the DCF valuation (via the probability 
of default) and lower recovery rates, it is assumed that the value of both asset classes will de- 
crease significantly in the 450 Scenario. Such an impact can be compared to a rating change in 
the international bond market, which is applied in the course of a transformational event, e.g. a 
“structural change  to  the  industry  or  competitive  environment,”  according  to  S&P  (2013). 
Moody’s (2017) expressed its concerns over “significant credit risks from the carbon transition” 




The projection of future cash flows for the artificial oil and gas company under the 450 
Scenario assumes a revenue growth rate of 16.8% between 2016 and 2020 (mainly driven by a 
rising oil price), subsequently flattening out to 0.9% from 2021 onwards. Capital expenditure 
decreases slightly in anticipation of reduced demand by 1.3% of the yearly growth rate. The 
total valuation expressed by the discounted future cash flows adds up to USD 97.6bn. 
In contrast, under the CPS the revenues of the company grow at a similar level in the short term 
(17.5%) and then stay at a relatively high level of 4.2%, as derived from the IEA (2016) pro- 
jections for 2030 by the formula of the compounded annual interest. The growth rate of capital 
expenditure is increasing by 0.4% per annum. Hence, the final value is USD 134.8bn, or 27.6% 




Figures 5 and 6 exhibit the sensitivity to changes in the weighted average cost of capital, the 
growth rate of capital expenditure as well as the aggregate price and demand change of oil in 
the DCF analysis. The sensitivity analysis only refers to the 450 Scenario, as similar outcomes 
for the CPS render a second sensitivity analysis for each scenario unnecessary. In this 
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model, the weighted average cost of capital does not seem to be a major determinant of the final 
value of the company: on average, a 2% change in the cost of capital influenced the final 
enterprise value by 0.14% (Figure 5). However, changing the aggregated price and demand of 
oil does change the projected enterprise value substantially. A 5% change of the weighted 
average cost of capital leads, on average, to a 7% change in enterprise value (Figure 5 and 6). 
This is not a surprising finding, as the revenue projection of a company in the DCF is one of the 
most crucial predictors of the final value. 
The valuation seems especially sensitive to small changes in the growth rate of capital 
expenditure: the average impact of an additional 1% change in the growth rate of capital 
expenditure is a -10% change in enterprise value. This relationship is negative because a higher 
capital expenditure presses the free cash flow down. It should also be noted that the capital 
expenditure is one of the major expenses for oil and gas companies, since it is on average 
among the five largest oil and gas producers in the dataset equivalent to more than 11% of sales 













The second part of the analysis deals with the potential losses for bonds and loans. Due to 
higher seniority, the expected losses for loans are lower than for bonds. In the 450S, the 
impairments of loans amount to 3,7%, whereas 5.1% of bonds are affected. 
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6.1 Banks 
 
As banks do not hold equities and only a negligible share of bonds of fossil fuel producers, they 
are impacted almost exclusively by the impairments in loans. Based on the analysis these losses 
amount to 5.4% of all fossil fuel related loans and approximately 0.2% of total assets (Figure 4 
and 9). Despite the relatively little exposure to fossil fuel assets, banks suffer the second 
greatest loss among all three financial sectors in total terms: USD1.7bn (Figure 10). Assuming 
that all banks have an equally large share of fossil fuel loans in their balance sheet, the average 
loss per institution amounts to USD 482m. 
Thanks to strong CET 1 ratios of ING (12.6%), Rabobank (13.7 %) and ABN (16.4%), the 
potential losses as a result of fossil fuel exposure may be absorbed without causing major 
turbulences for the balance sheets of the banks (ING, 2017; Rabobank, 2017; ABN, 2017). 
These data were retrieved from the banks’ respective balance sheet as on 31-12-2016. ING is 
only affected by 0.2%, Rabobank by 0.2% and ABN has 0.5% of fossil fuel loan impairments 
(Figure 7). The differences can be explained by the different magnitude of the balance sheets; 
hence equal losses are more easily absorbed by a larger capital buffer of CET 1 capital (in this 
case by the largest bank ING). After accounting for the losses, all banks are still far above the 






Figure 7: CET 1 ratios of the three largest banks after the impairment for losses with respect to bad 




Insurers are the principal holder of fossil fuel bonds among the three financial sectors (1.4% of 
total assets). In addition, they are exposed to fossil fuel equities (0.3%) and to a negligible 
A	  Carbon	  Stress	  Test	  of	  the	  Dutch	  Financial	  Sector	   24 
amount of loans and other fossil fuel assets (0.1% each) (Figure 4). However, due to the 
relatively greater impact of equity losses (28.5%) vs losses of bonds (5.1%) and loans (3.7%), 
the share of fossil fuel losses with respect to total assets is almost equal (0.1% each). In total, 
insurers lose approximately USD 815m in the 450 Scenario (Figure 9). 
Due to limited public financial data availability regarding most of the Dutch insurers, the 
impact on an individual institution can only be shown by the example of Achmea. At the end of 
2016, Achmea constituted by far the largest insurance company in the Netherlands with a 
market share  of  25%  (Verbond  van  Verzekeraars,  2016).  Achmea  had  eligible  own  funds  
worth USD 10bn and required capital of USD 5.5bn, implying a solvency ratio of 180.5% 
(Achmea, 2017). After deducting the expected loss of USD 204m, the capital ratio diminishes 
by 3.7% to 176.8%, still far exceeding the required rate of 100%. Assuming the remaining 
insurers have similar capital buffers as Achmea, the loss related to fossil fuel assets does not 
seem to jeopardise the financial stability of the insurance sector. 
 
6.3 Pension Funds 
 
Pension funds suffer the highest aggregate losses, both in total and relative to total assets of 
USD 790bn (0.6% or USD 4.5bn) among the three financial sectors, mainly because 2% of total 
assets are made up of fossil fuel equities (Figure 4 and 9). Equity losses amount to 0.6% of total 
assets while bond losses are negligible (0.03%). Potential losses of other assets on the portfolio 
of pension funds are not included in the analysis of the stress test. 
 
ABP as the largest institution in the Netherlands (50.6% market share among the largest six 
pension funds) and the second largest institution in Europe with own funds worth USD 492bn 
incurs the highest losses of USD 2.7bn. The smallest pension fund in the sample, ING pension 
fund, has only 3.4% market share among the largest institutions and incurs losses of USD 180m 
(relative to own funds worth USD 32.7bn). 
 
Figure 8 exhibits the carbon asset related losses after the stress test. The average funding ratio 
among the six largest pension funds is 105.4% as of 31-01-2018. This puts them above the 
statutory minimum required funding ratio of 104.2% recommended by the DNB (2017c). How- 
ever, the high funding ratio of bpfBOUW distracts the fact that actually three of the largest six 
Dutch pension funds fall below the minimum required funding ratio: PFZW (103,0%), PMT 
(102,5%) and ING (95,5%). After distributing the losses of USD 4.5bn according to weight of 
the pension funds’ assets, the losses lower the funding ratio between 0.5% (ING) and 0.7% 
(bpfBOUW).





Figure 8: the six largest pension fund’s loss absorption after the stress test 
 
 
Yet, the average funding ratio of the six pension funds stays above the minimum required 
funding ratio (104.8%). Even if pension funds had to absorb higher losses than in this scenario, 
they would still be the most flexible financial institution to adjust to challenging market 
environments. Generally, pension funds can do four things to recover from financial distress: 
cut benefits, raise contributions from its members, postpone annual index-linking (automatic 
mechanism that increases according to wages and price levels) and increase investment returns. 
These measures may be required by the regulatory body when pension funds are below the 
minimum required funding ratio for five years. DNB (2017d) found that pension funds in the 
Netherlands rely almost exclusively on achieving surplus returns on their investments to 
eliminate their deficit. While the stress test does not cause the pension funds to get into 
financial trouble, it reveals the vulnerability with respect to its funding ratios towards 
macroeconomic shocks. 
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At first sight, the results of the carbon stress test seem to allow for a clear conclusion: the Dutch 
financial sectors are able to withstand a carbon policy shock (450S) induced by government 
regulation. The expected losses for banks and insurers are not close to jeopardise the capital 
buffers of the sectors. The portfolios of pension funds are the most vulnerable; low capital 
buffers could potentially lead to severe portfolio losses triggered by a carbon policy shock. 
 
However, this does not imply that individual institutions with below average sector capital 
buffers are as secure against losses as large institutions like ING or Achmea. Smaller 
institutions with larger fossil fuel asset exposure and lower capital buffers are the most 
vulnerable in the advent of a policy shock. Since this stress test analyses only on the sector 
level, future stress test should take into account exposures on the institutional level. For this to 
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happen, financial institutions will have to require more carbon related information from 
companies they are financing in order to perform a proper risk assessment. Specifically, 
knowledge about the carbon intensity of a firms’ inputs and technologies would enable a better 
quantification of potential effects, as suggested by ESRB (2016). 
 
Although the results do not imply an imminent risk that threats the underlying financial stability 
in the short term, policy makers should nevertheless be aware of carbon policy related shocks to 
the fossil fuel industry that have the potential to contage the financial sector as well. Since 
contagion happens via exposure to assets of the fossil fuel sector, several regulatory means 
seem possible to limit the severity of the impact of carbon asset risk. 
 
First of all, institutions could be disincentivised to hold assets of carbon intensive firms by 
implementing capital surcharges based on the carbon intensity of individual exposures. Another 
idea would be to cap the overall exposure of institutions by applying exposure limits to the 
overall investment in carbon intensive assets that will be most vulnerable to a sudden transition 
to a low carbon economy (ESRB, 2016). 
 
Thirdly, the promotion of long term best practice investment strategies for institutional inves- 
tors could lead to a paradigm shift in the way carbon risk is taken more seriously as an 
important investment  criteria.  Possible  application  strategies  include  promoting low  carbon  
indices  or joint exclusion criteria. Some major institutional investors have already started to 
implement carbon related exclusion criteria (Black Rock, 2016). This also increases the 
pressure on carbon intensive firms to reduce investments in potentially stranded assets (Weyzig 
et al, 2014). The European Commission is considering recalibrating capital requirements for 
banks by introducing a “green supporting factor.” The approach is focusing on supporting green 
investments rather than requiring additional capital requirements for investment in carbon 
intensive assets (European Commission, 2018). 
 
Additionally, financial institutions should not make the mistake to point at their stable capital 
buffers and ignore carbon asset risk in future risk assessments. Too many known and less 
obvious variables are involved that may trigger a black swan event (Taleb, 2007). For example, 
advances in clean technologies are rapidly advancing, thereby contributing to the acceleration 
of the energy transition (IRENA, 2017); by the same magnitude, other external shocks may 
cause sudden energy price movements that may alter the speed and smoothness of the 
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transition. This is to say that a potential shock does not have to come from government 
legislation but might as well be brought about by innovations in the private sector. Large-scale 
battery storage and electric vehicles have the potential to reduce drastically oil demand in the 




8. Methodological limitations 
 
The DCF valuation methodology is commonly applied to value an individual firm. Although 
the five largest oil and gas multinationals have a substantial amount of market share, it neglects 
the fact that the fossil fuel sector is made up of many smaller and more specialised firms. Those 
firms are likely to exhibit more volatile cash flows, making it more difficult to project cash 
flows into the future. To at least partly compensate for the bias of taking larger firms, the bond 
valuation takes into account the probability of default rate for the entire oil industry. 
 
Another assumption made in the DCF is that future revenue is contingent on the oil price and 
demand development. However, the trend to more diversification in the industry means that this 
relationship will weaken in the future. On the other hand, since the price of gas is strongly 
correlated to the price of oil, it still seems fair to assume that the oil price and demand is the 
major determinant of future revenues (Villar & Joutz, 2006). 
 
In this paper, only the exposure of the financial sector to the oil, gas and coal industry is ana- 
lysed. Nevertheless, other fossil fuel intensive sectors, such as utilities, chemical or the 
transport sector would also be substantially affected by the introduction of a carbon price. This 
would add further “stress” on the portfolios of financial institutions and should be considered 
by future carbon stress tests. 
 
The valuation of bonds assumes the same probability of default and dirty price for the entire 
portfolio of fossil fuel bonds. Yet, in practice the portfolios of banks, insurers and pension 
funds consist of bonds with varying degrees of length and yield to maturity. Due to the fact that 
the available aggregate data does not reveal any details about the maturity levels of bonds, no 
further breakdown was applied. 
 
Lastly, the result may be underestimated because second order effects were ignored as a 
potential consequence of the policy shock in this analysis. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
The paper investigates the consequences of a carbon policy shock in the form of carbon pricing 
for the fossil fuel sector on the portfolio of banks, insurers and pension funds in the 
Netherlands. The shock is simulated by applying the 450 Scenario by the International Energy 
Agency that limits global warming to 2°C until 2100. Thanks to strong capital buffers, the 
financial stability of Dutch banks and insurers is not jeopardised in the event of losses in the 
fossil fuel portfolio. On average, banks lose USD 482m, equivalent to a 0.3% diminishment of 
their common equity tier 1 capital. The example of Achmea, the largest insurer in the 
Netherlands, illustrates that a 3.8% deduction does not have a significant impact on the capital 
ratio (still far exceeding the minimum required rate). The case is different for pension funds, 
however. Pension funds are by far the most vulnerable financial sector to transition risk because 
their portfolio is exposed to 1.9% of fossil fuel equities. Additionally, three out of the six 
largest pension funds already score below the minimum required funding ratio of 104.2% 
before the stress test is conducted. Hence, even the relatively little reduction (on average 0.6%) 
of the funding ratio exposes the financially weak position of the pension fund sector. 
Fortunately, pension funds are better able to overcome financial distress than banks or insurers. 
 
While the results of the climate stress test indicate that no financial turbulences are to be ex- 
pected if the OECD governments were to implement decisive carbon pricing schemes in the 
next years, the mere fact that one fossil fuel intensive sector can already lead to substantial 
losses for selected asset classes should serve as a warning to the financial sector. Most likely, 
further research that takes into account all relevant carbon intensive sectors will find a more 
dramatic impact on financial stability. 
 
Regulators who understand the possible repercussions of the carbon bubble have various tools 
at their disposal to limit its impact. Ideas put forward by scholars range from disincentivising 
investment into carbon intensive firms to setting exposure limits to the overall investment in 
carbon intensive assets. 
 
Although climate change stress testing has yet to become fully institutionalised by regulators, 
the growing importance and speed of transition to a world with less GHG emissions implies 
that climate stress tests for the financial system are here to stay. 
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Scenario	   2016	   2020	   2030	   CAGR	  **	  
2016	  –	  	  
2020	  
CAGR	  	  
2020	  –	  	  
2030	  
CPS	  
price	  in	  USD	  per	  barrel	  
43	   80	   130	   	   	  
price	  %	  increase	  
	   86.0%	   62.5%	   16.8%	   5.0%	  
demand	  mb/d	  
91	   97.5	   107.3	   	   	  
production	  %	  increase	  
	   7.1%	   10.1%	   1.7%	   1.0%	  
sum	  price	  increase	  and	  
production	  increase	  
	   	   	   18.5%	   5.9%	  
NPS	  
price	  in	  USD	  per	  barrel	  
43	   80	   113	   	   	  
price	  %	  increase	  
	   86.0%	   41.3%	   16.8%	   3.5%	  
demand	  mb/d	  
91	   	   107.2*	   	   	  
production	  %	  increase	  
	   	   17.8%	   0.7%*	   0.7%	  
sum	  price	  increase	  and	  
production	  increase	  
 	   	   17.5%	   4.2%	  
450S	  
price	  in	  USD	  per	  barrel	  
43	   78	   95	   	   	  
price	  %	  increase	  
	   	   	   16.1%	   1.7%	  
demand	  mb/d	  
91	   93.7	   83.9	   	   	  
production	  %	  increase	  
	   3.0%	   -­‐10.5%	   0.7%	   -­‐1.1%	  
sum	  price	  increase	  and	  
production	  increase	  
	   	   	   16.8%	   0.6%	  
*	  2030	  figure	  not	  available,	  therefore	  2040	  projection	  taken	  to	  compute	  CAGR	  
**	  CAGR	  =	  compounded	  annual	  growth	  rate.	  Formula:	  
(ending	  value/beginning	  value)^(1/n)	  -­‐	  1
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